Contents

 

The President's Address

 

Issue Focus

"Normative" and "Intuitive" Senses of Justice by Melvin J. Lerner

Collective Aspects of Justice by Karen A. Hegtvedt

Interdisciplinary Social Justice Research by Stefan Liebig, Holger Lengfeld and Steffen Mau
 

News about SJR

 

New Books about and around Justice

 

Forthcoming election of the next President

 

Awards and Honourings

The President's Address

This is ISJR's first newsletter. Ron Cohen is to be commended for having put it together and edited it. I am also grateful to Dr. Weichselgartner, German Institute of Psychology Information, and Anette Weidler-Neu for their technical help in implementing ISJR's website and this newsletter.

These tools provide a platform for active communication and exchange of information among members. Please send all information destined for the newsletter to Ron Cohen. You may also have single items of news and requests for information entered into the news section of the homepage by notifying me. The mailing list of all ISJR members, which will be regularly updated, can also be used to disseminate information and requests. In setting up this platform, we have taken a further small step to becoming an active, productive, and visible scientific group.

The most important step toward achieving this aim was the willingness of you, the members, to join ISJR. Looking at the impressive list of members, we can be proud. Proud, but not yet content, as we know of many more who did and who are doing important work in the field of justice. Due to a lack of accurate information about their current addresses, many colleagues we would like to invite to join ISJR have not yet been reached. Please take a look at the list of members and feel free to nominate anyone you see is missing – if possible, with her or his address.

Nominations for colleagues from disciplines which are still underrepresented, e.g., law, political science, economics, anthropology, philosophy, and management, are especially welcome. Interdisciplinary cross-fertilization is probably the most important momentum for scientific development. Furthermore, meeting scholars from other disciplines may open new scientific horizons for one's own development and impact. New disciplines typically emerge from interdisciplinary cooperation. We would thus urge you nominate all those from other disciplines whose work has given you a new perspective, and all those you would like to acquaint with your own work.

A vivid and productive scientific association has debates and even disputes about the potency of concepts, the validity and productivity of theories, and the validity of methodological approaches. This newsletter and the ISJR's scientific meetings are intended to provide a platform for such debates. We don't need hostile debates, but we do need serious controversies. Though the section on "scientific controversies" is still empty in this first newsletter, I am pleased to identify a number of topics for productive debate in all three of the scientific contributions to this newsletter.

Let us try together to create a good culture of scientific disputation.

May 2001

Leo Montada
 

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Issue Focus
 
 

"Normative" and "Intuitive" Senses of Justice

Melvin J. Lerner

We now have rather convincing evidence that people walk around with two remarkably different senses of justice. One, the "normative," is very familiar and can be readily observed in the way people think and talk about justice related issues. It consists of the publicly available societal norms that define people’s entitlements and the more or less rational deliberations people employ, individually or collectively, to arrive at moral judgments. In this conventional mode of conversation people arrive at their judgments through relatively thoughtful application of normatively appropriate rules for attributing responsibility and arriving at judgments of merit, blame and culpability. And, it is commonly assumed that, when given the opportunity, people will make more or less rational choices intended to promote their self-interest. 

By contrast, the other sense of justice, the "intuitive," based upon people’s immediate sense of right and wrong, takes the form of automatic judgments of blame, with attempts to restore justice. These reactions, often accompanied by emotions such as anger, outrage, or sadness, are primarily determined by the extent of apparent harm and the elicited emotions which accompany it, rather than the product of thoughtful, rational analysis. The dominant motivational themes in this intuitive sense of justice have little to do with rational self-interest, but rather appear to be the direct expressions of primitive scripts and exemplars such as "bad things are caused by bad people," and "bad things happen to bad people." Typically, people cannot consciously recall and represent the "introspectively opaque" bases of these immediately compelling intuitive judgments (Epstein, Lipson, Hostein, & Hub, 1992; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). They simply know them to be true and valid, and act upon them without need for reasoned justification and without consideration of the associated costs to themselves.

There is some evidence pertaining to the social psychological processes involved in these two senses of justice To begin with, the evidence is fairly clear that they consist of very different rules for judging what is fair and deserved, as well as quite different dynamics in terms of when they are aroused and how they affect people’s reactions. Most people would have no trouble describing the rational, norm-based sense of justice that appears in people’s conscious moral reasoning. It is, however, up to the next generation of research to develop a more systematic description of the origins and content of the intuition based sense of justice that is often irrational by conventional standards and often personally costly. Also, we need to know much more about the interaction between these "normative" and "intuitive" senses of justice. When, under what conditions, are people’s reactions likely to reflect either or, in some way, a blending of both, these senses of justice?

Fortunately, one can find various recently developed theoretical perspectives that might be useful in attempting to answer these questions in Chaiken and Trope’s (1999) edited volume Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology. The volume contains several recent efforts to understand the relations between implicit, pre-conscious, automatic, processes and the conscious, explicit, thoughtful, controlled processing of information. Although only a few chapters in the volume explicitly discuss evidence pertaining to the justice motive, many others contain theoretical insights that can be used to re-examine the available literature. Let us look at some of the presently available research findings. The Automatic Appearance of the Intuition Based Reaction Considerable evidence suggests that people’s automatic initial reactions to "bad" outcomes involve assigning blame to the person most directly associated with those outcomes: The worse the outcome, the greater the condemnation . It is important to note that people not only condemn others for such outcomes, they often blame themselves for clearly accidental harm in ways that far exceed what would be required by normatively appropriate rules of culpability. These irrational but intuitively compelling reactions seems to occur automatically, regardless of whether one is either the harmdoer or the victim, or merely the observer ( see e.g. Alicke & Davis,1989; Freedman, 1970; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; McGraw, 1986.). One could make the case that the resultant guilt, or blaming reactions, of accidental harmdoers closely resemble the "moral realism" Piaget (1932) observed among the youngest children, and are clearly contrary to conventional standards of rational self-interest.

By early adolescence, and certainly as adults, people are supposed to have replaced those primitive forms of blame with a "moral relativism" based upon thoughtful analysis of the harmdoer’s intentions, etc. Of course, that often does occur, but when? 

Moral Reasoning Predominates Under Conditions of Norm Salience and Minimal Involvement
The initial answer to that question seems to be: When, if, people are given sufficient time and the opportunity, they will often recall the conventional rules for assigning blame and over-rule their initial irrational reactions. And , at times, if not particularly emotionally disturbed by the apparent injustice, they may react rationally from the outset, especially when the relevant societal norms are salient. For example, Epstein et al (1992) were able to have their research participants "undo" an automatic, rather primitive, but common, blaming reaction. Miller and Gunasegaram (1990) had previously demonstrated the outcome-driven blaming of people associated with accidental harm. In their research, two people were offered a large payment if the coins they tossed both came up heads or tails. They tossed the coins in sequence, and the second person’s toss did not match the first. Objectively, both the first and second tossing have an equal role in the "chance" outcome; however, as Miller and Gunasegaram (1990) demonstrated, both participants and observers tend to view the person doing the second toss as more responsible and more "guilty" for the loss of the reward because the second toss did not match the first. 

Similarly, Simons and Piliavin (1972: see also Simons, 1968, and Lerner, 1971) showed that people would derogate a suffering innocent victim, but not when they were explicitly reminded (1) of the appropriate societal norms that require people to react compassionately to innocent victims, and (2) that the victim they were observing was truly innocent. Also, Simons and Piliavin (1972) and Lerner (1971) found that observers would not derogate that same victim, nor would they predict condemnation by others, when they were not emotionally disturbed by the victims fate. That is, they either believed her suffering was in the past or that she was merely playing a role.

Consistent with these findings, Skitka and Tetlock (1992, 1993) and Weiner (1993) reported several examples of conventional moral reasoning by participants who were role playing and reacting to vignette descriptions of more or less innocent victims. The key events in these norm-confirming findings consist of the minimization of the emotion-based intuitive reaction to the victim’s suffering and the increased salience of the societal norms for blaming and compassion. Again, the tentative conclusion based upon such findings would be that when appropriate societal norms are salient, people’s normative sense of justice will replace or preclude their intuitive morality. 

Additional evidence conceptually consistent with this general hypothesis can be found in Bazerman, White, and Lowenstein’s (1995) research on people’s preferences for fairness and economic profit. They reported several experiments where people’s automatic, intuitive reactions revealed greater preferences for "fair" payments than for larger but less fair ones. However, when asked to choose between alternatives that explicitly pitted fairness and economic self interest, their participants opted predominantly for the larger but less fair pay. Bazerman et al, (1995) concluded from their research that when confronted with an explicit, conscious choice between fairness and economic self-interest, people find greater support from societal norms for choosing the more profitable outcome. Similar findings have been reported by Sears and Lau (1983) in their studies of people’s reactions to political choices: People based their political judgments on economic self-interest primarily when they were reminded of that issue. Without the explicit reminder, other values and attitudes seemed to predominate. 

Miller’s earlier research (Miller 1975, 1977) revealed that young men were more motivated to work by the opportunity to get a fair wage and help innocent victims than by the opportunity to keep all the pay for themselves. Yet, when asked to predict their reactions, similar young men voiced considerably greater preference for the opportunity to keep all the pay for themselves than to help the victims. Apparently, the norm of self-interest dominated their thoughtful predictions, but not their immediate intuitive reactions when directly confronted with the opportunity to help. Considerable subsequent research by Miller and his colleagues (Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1996) clearly confirms the hypothesis that rational self-interest appears as the dominant norm in conscious deliberations and social predictions, but not necessarily in people’s automatic personal preferences. 

Can The Intuitive Sense of Justice Take Precedence Over Rational Thought? 
Anecdotal Evidence
On the basis of this and related literature, one might conclude that, whenever the normative sense of justice is made salient, it "trumps," takes precedence over, the person’s intuitive reaction. It is probably true that, when given the incentive and opportunity to engage in conscious deliberations, people will be more likely to engage in relatively rational thought and reveal what they believe to be the normatively appropriate reactions. But there is also some experimental evidence to support the anecdotal observations in which the often cognitively primitive forms of people’s intuitive sense of justice seem impervious to rational, conscious efforts. Consider, first, some of the anecdotal evidence. In one such incident, a friend of mine from another department went to visit one of her graduate students at her home. At the end of their meeting, my friend got in the car and, as she backed out of her parking place, she heard people screaming. She quickly stopped and got out of the car when she saw people yelling and rushing toward her. She was shocked to discover she had "accidentally" driven over the leg of a very young child who had literally run under the tires of my friend’s car. The child’s parents and all who saw it happen did everything they could to console and reassure my friend, including pointing out that the child had miraculously suffered only very minor injuries. As everyone reminded her, by any commonly accepted standards of morality my friend was not to blame for the "accident." 

Nevertheless, in spite of everyone’s explicit behavior and the objective evidence, for quite a time after, she was devastated by guilt and regret for what she had "done". But why did she blame herself in spite of all the evidence? Some social psychologists would insist that she was engaging in a performance intended to prevent her social exclusion and demonstrate her allegiance to the group-norms. But it was excruciatingly apparent that her reactions had nothing to do with any public demonstrations. She was living a private hell, and I don’t think she had any choice in the matter. It was a powerful intuitive reaction over which she had no conscious control. In the same vein, Levinson (1994), and others have reported extraordinary amounts of irrational guilt among executives who had previously participated in the rational decision to discharge otherwise adequate employees for the benefit of the corporation and its stakeholders, including the surviving employees. 

Apparently, consistent with the "introspectively opaque" aspect of the intuitive sense of justice, the irrational guilt was not at all anticipated in the earlier, thoughtful deliberations leading to the discharge of the employees. It only appeared in response to the direct evidence of the harm they had done to the affected employees. 

Similar irrational self punitive reactions were observed by Rubin and Peplau (1973) among those young men who just learned they had "lost" the random lottery and would be drafted and ultimately sent to Vietnam. The majority of these young men revealed measurable lowering of their self-esteem. Why? It was a random event. 

Experiment-Based Demonstrations of the Persistence of "Irrational" Intuitive Reactions to Injustices 
There is recent experiment-generated evidence suggesting that the intuitive sense of justice will influence people’s reactions as long as they remain emotionally aroused by the event, and their sense of justice has not been satisfied. In several experiments the participants first witnessed a vivid portrayal of an injustice--a bully beating and humiliating a sympathetically vulnerable victim (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; J. Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998), or someone who had been robbed. (Hafer,2000) Subsequently, the participants revealed direct and indirect evidence of being somewhat pre-occupied with issues of deserving and justice, as well as feeling angry. And, their level of pre-occupation and anger influenced their reactions to the victim or a third party who had been a negligent harmdoer: The greater the anger, the greater their punitiveness to the negligent harm doer, and the greater their pre-occupation with deserving, the greater their condemnation of the victim--possibly as a way of restoring their intuitive sense of justice. Those reactions, however, did not appear if the participants were also led to believe the initial harmdoers had been captured and punished: Their intuitive sense of justice had been satisfied, at least sufficiently so that it did not intrude into their subsequent, more normatively appropriate reactions to victims or harmdoers. 

The Need to Look Back and Re-Examine What We Thought We Knew About the Justice Motive
Hopefully, I have presented enough evidence to inspire or entice some of you to examine these two senses of justice--their psychological origins, dynamics, and interrelationships as they appear in people’s lives. In addition, I strongly recommend that we all reconsider the available research literature that has presumably studied justice related issues. For each published study, it is important to consider the relationship between the research methods and the interpretations offered by the investigators. In particular, it is essential that we recognize the theoretical pitfalls inherent in research methods that purport to study the justice motive in situations that are minimally engaging, emotionally and motivationally, and that provide the participants with the opportunity and motivation to arrive at thoughtful reactions. The great risk is that such research efforts will generate conclusions primarily based on people’s expression of the normative sense of justice. Of course, it is possible for people to reveal automatic, intuitive reactions in surveys, responses to vignettes, and experimental simulations, but the risk remains high that in those contexts the participants’ intuition based justice motive will be cloaked beneath the more thoughtful and normatively acceptable response. Obviously, there is much to be learned from studying people’s understanding of societal norms--social scientists do it all the time--but serious problems arise from attempting to characterize the nature and importance of the justice motive simply from societal norms defining people’s entitlements and obligations. I would like to believe that at least some of this next generation of investigators will, once again, examine the centrally important ways both the normative and intuitive senses of justice appear in people’s lives. 
 

References

Alicke, M.D., & Davis, T.L. (1989) The role of a posteriori victim information on judgments of blame and sanction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,25,
362-377.

Bazerman, M.H., White, S.B., & Lowenstein, G.F. (1995) Perceptions of fairness in interpersonal and individual choice situations. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 4, 39-42.

Chaiken, S. & Trope, Y.(Eds.) (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New York: Guilford Press.

Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Hostein, C., & Hub, E.(1992) Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 62, 328-339.

Freedman, J.L., (1970) Transgression, compliance, and guilt. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press.

Goldberg, J, Lerner, J., & Tetlock, P.( 1999) Rage and reason: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 781-795. 

Hafer, C.( 2000). Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world. Evidence from a modified Stroop task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,165-173.

Hardin, R., (1996) Distributive justice in a real world. In L. Montada & M.J. Lerner (Eds.), Current societal concerns about justice (pp. 9-24). New York: Plenum.

Lerner, J., Goldberg, J. & Tetlock, P.(1998) Sober second thoughts: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 563-574 

Lerner, M.J. (1971) Observers' evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt, and veridical perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 20, 17-35. 

Lerner, M.J., & Matthews, G. ( 1967) Reactions to the suffering of others under conditions of indirect responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
5, 319-325. 

Levenson, H.(1994) Why the behemoths fell: Psychological roots of corporate failure. American Psychologist, 49, 428-436. 

McGraw, K.M. (1987) Guilt following transgression: An attribution of responsibility approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 247-256.

Miller, D.T., (1975) Personal deserving vs. justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive, Doctoral dissertation. University of Waterloo.

Miller,D.T., (1977) Personal deserving and justice for others: An exploration of the justice motive. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 1-13.

Miller, D.T.(1999) The norm of self interest. American Psychologist, 54, 1053-1060.

Miller, D.T & Gunasegaram, S.(1990) Temporal order and the perceived mutability of events: Implications of blame assignment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1111-1118. 

Miller, D.T. & Ratner, R.K. (1996) The power of the myth of self-interest. In L. Montada & M.J. Lerner (Eds) Current societal concerns about justice (pp. 25-48). New York: Plenum Press.

Piaget, J., (1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Harcourt, Brace

Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L.A., (1973) Belief in a just world and reactions to another's lot: A study of participants in the national draft lottery. Journal of Social Issues, 29, 73- 93.

Sears, D.O. & Lau, R.R. (1983) Inducing apparently self-interested political preferences. American Journal of Political Science, 27, 223-252.

Shweder, R.A. & Haidt, J., (1993) The future of moral psychology: Truth, intuition, and the pluralist way. Psychological Science, 4, 360-365.

Simons, C.(1968) The effects of deception manipulations within an experiment on reactions to victims of misfortune. M.A. thesis. University of Pennsylvania.

Simons. C., & Piliavin, J. (1972) The effect of deception on reactions to a victim. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 56-60.

Skitka, L.J. & Tetlock, P.E.(1992) Allocating aid: The roles of scarcity, ideology, causal attributions, and distributive norms. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 397-409.

Skitka, L.J. & Tetlock, P.E. (1993) Providing public assistance: Cognitive and motivational processes underlying liberal and conservative policy preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1205-1223.

Weiner, B.(1993) On sin versus sickness: A theory of perceived responsibility and social motivation. American Psychologist, 48, 957-965.
 
 

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Collective Aspects of Justice

Karen Hegtvedt

As a social psychologist, the mantra that rings in my ears emphasizes that what I study involves the implied, imagined, or real presence of others on the individual. As a justice researcher, the other chant I hear is "justice is in the eye of the beholder." My social psychology mantra reminds me of the importance of the group, while the justice mantra, with its emphasis on the perceptions and evaluations of the individual, may seem discordant. The two, however, are quite harmonious when one recognizes that despite the emphasis on individual-level processes in justice judgments and responses, justice is really a collective process.  What is just may be defined simply as congruence with expectations, a comparison between the actual and "just share," or the application of a normative rule. Those expectations, the just share, those norms, however, ultimately stem from an under research and my future research pertain to that relatively overlooked collective aspect of justice inherent in the notion that justice is consensual. Much theorizing and research assume that people agree on what is just, yet many allocation studies demonstrate that people have different preferences for what would be a fair distribution (see Hegtvedt & Markovsky 1995).  Many real world situations demonstrate the preponderance of competing justice claims:  e.g., congressional debates over budget cuts and funding levels; environmental disputes; divorce proceedings.  A key question becomes, "How do people achieve some consensus on what is fair?"

In a 1992 piece I attempted to answer this question theoretically by focusing on negotiation processes. What I discovered when I attempted experimentally to examine bargaining as a means to resolve competing justice claims was that it was very difficult to manipulate different perceptions manipulation, my study participants often disagreed on what they thought was a fair distribution of pay in a three-person group. Typically, if individuals took a self-interested approach to bargaining to resolve their differences, the negotiation process took much longer than when they employed a bi-lateral approach, which recognized the interest of the other party (Hegtvedt, Brezina, & Funk 1995). Ironically, but as expected, materially self-interested subjects were more likely to cry "Its not fair!" than those whose initial allocations seemed to reflect concern with the outcomes of others. These results call attention to an important distinction in understanding individuals' beliefs about fairness: the extent to which they are self- or other-directed (see Törnblom 1988). The notion of considering how a distribution affects the outcomes of others highlights one way in which justice, as distinct from justified self-interest, involves an emphasis on the collect allocation studies typically circumscribe what constitutes a collectivity to the other recipients in a distribution of resources. Few studies examine the evaluations and reactions of more than a focal actor in the circle of recipients. One critical exception is Kahn et al.'s (1982) study involving face-to-face discussions of what group members thought would constitute a fair distribution. Results of that study demonstrate that groups end up promoting the distribution principle suggested by the group member whose preference did not reflect self-interest. In addition, a few studies suggest that group members' shared beliefs about a leader's responsibility for inequity (Lawler & Thompson 1978) or about their support for one another's actions (Lawler 1975) encourages collective reactions to injustice. Generally, however, there is a paucity of research on the effects of others' beliefs and behaviors on an individual's evaluation of and response to injustice. Yet, comparison key collective element missing from much justice research. 

To address this omission, my colleague, Cathryn Johnson, and I have begun to examine theoretically the effects of legitimacy - a classic collective process - on perceptions of and reactions to injustice (Hegtvedt& Johnson 2000).  Ridgeway and Walker (1995) describe legitimacy as "...the process by which patterns of social action acquire a normative character" (p. 282). By joining justice and legitimacy, we address a means other than negotiation by which individuals may develop a consensual imageof what constitutes a just share or a normative rule of justice. Cohen (1986) anticipated such a wedding of processes in his analysis of the effects of power and legitimacy on collective responses to injustice.
Our approach draws primarily on the work of Zelditch and Walker (1984; Walker & Zelditch 1993). They argue that forms of legitimacy constitute external so authority within an organization.  Individuals are more likely to comply with a rule or to the commands of an authority that is legitimated, owing to the possibility of sanctions for failure to comply. In a series of studies involving a five-person Bavelas communication wheel network, Zelditch and Walker create a situation of inequity in which the central actor has greater access to information and consequently receives a much greater share of the reward. Whether peripheral group members collectively mobilize their resources depends upon the extent to which the structure of the group is legitimated. When research participants perceive the network structure to be valid, thereby recognizing their obligation to obey its norms despite their personal disapproval of them, they are less likely to demand changes to the network (Thomas, Walker, & Zelditch 1986). Similarly, if individuals believe that there is support for the existing to attempt to alter the network (Walker, Thomas, & Zelditch 1986). Validity of the structure and "endorsement" by equals appears to affect individuals' personal perceptions of the appropriateness of the structure, thus inhibiting their attempts at collective mobilization. Results from a vignette study involving a pay conflict between an employer and worker (Johnson & Ford 1996) replicate the effects of endorsement and also demonstrate that when superiors support the actions of the employer, individuals are less likely to attempt to change the situation. When support for norms comes from individuals who occupy higher positions, then "authorization" exists.

Generally, our work links elements of legitimacy - endorsement and authorization - to processes underlying justice assessments (e.g., social perceptions and comparisons) and predicts individuals' evaluations of justice and emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses t social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) and the group value model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler 1988) to highlight the impact of group identity on the salience of types of legitimacy, as well as to juxtapose the impact of legitimacy and procedural fairness. By combining these elements we assess the relative impact of the fairness perceptions of others on an individual's own judgment and subsequent behaviors. In effect, we examine how the beholder of justice is influenced by the (implied, imagined, or real) presence of collectivity members, a process which may result in a consensual view of what is just in a given situation.

We have planned a series of experiments. Although our main concern is with the effects of endorsement and authorization, our work also allows us to examine classic, although rarely addressed, justice questions such as the extent to which emotions mediate reactions to injustice and the conditions under which individuals are likely cognitively or behaviorally to injustice. Our hypotheses pertain to situations characterized by the involvement of a focal actor who:

1) is embedded in an organization with at least three levels of authority; and 
2) receives an unjust low portion of pay;
3) from a one time allocation;
4) by a "third party" allocator who is not part of the recipient circle.

Because many things may be legitimated (e.g., power, rewards, rules, status, actors, acts), our first two experiments allow us to contrast the legitimacy of a distribution and the legitimacy of an authority's actions. Specifically, the first experiment focuses on the endorsement and authorization of an outcome distribution. In addition, we will examine the extent to which group identity increases or decreases the effects of the types of legitimacy.  We argue that a focal actor may question his or her initial perception of injustice if others support it, i.e., it has legitimacy.  In addition to undermining the focal actor's confid he or she may fear negative sanctions from others if he or she disagrees. Both questioning one's own perception and anticipating sanctions increases the costs of adhering to one's personal justice evaluation. Thus, we predict that the stronger the endorsement or authorization of a perceived unjust distribution, the less severely unjust an actor will perceive it to be.Other hypotheses focus on reactions to injustice. We suggest that when peers or authorities support a distribution, the focal actor may take a cue from them and attenuate his or her feelings of anger and resentment stemming from the personally perceived injustice to avoid informal or formal sanctions.  Moreover, to the extent that endorsement and authorization attenuate the severity of the perceived injustice and negative emotions, we expect them to be less likely to respond to injustice behaviorally. Instead, they may be more likely to distort cognitively authorization matters more is likely to depend on the extent to which the focal actor identifies with either group. Assuming that belonging to a group enhances the likelihood of creating favorable distinctions between groups, individuals are likely to value more highly and find more relevant the opinions of the group with which they identify. Thus, we expect that identification with peers will increase the impact of endorsement and identification with authorities will increase the impact of authorization on individual's justice perceptions, emotions, and reactions. When individuals perceive a distribution to be unfair, they are likely to attempt to determine why it is unfair.  In doing so, they may focus on the behavior of the allocator. Our second planned experiment examines two aspects of the allocator's behavior:  the use of fair and unfair procedures and the support the allocator has for his or her behavior from other are one means by which an authority achieves legitimacy. Here we may contrast the two sources of legitimacy, examining their effects separately and interactively on individuals justice perceptions and reactions. With regard to procedural justice, we employ the group value model to argue that the use of fair procedures binds group members together and indicates that they are valued. By doing so, an allocator essentially provides social rewards to group recipients, which may balance out inequalities in actual outcomes.  Thus we predict that the more fair the procedures, the less severely unjust an actor will perceive the outcome distribution to be. Collective support from peers or other authorities may strengthen the allocator's right to use any procedures, even unfair ones, to make any distribution, even one that leaves the focal actor objectively disadvantaged.  Such legitimation may encourage the focal actor make an external and unstable attribution for the allocator's behavior, which would mitigate the allocator's responsibility for making an unfair distribution. As a consequence, the focal actor may perceive the
distribution to be less severely unjust.

Although we expect main effects for both procedural justice and the types of legitimacy, procedures will be both more proximal to the focal actor and more salient in terms of what is considered in making the distribution. Thus, we expect that procedural justice will generally have a greater impact on perceptions of justice than collective sources of legitimacy. When procedures are unfair, however, it is likely that individuals again search for a cause of the unfairness.  If the allocator has support from others, then the focal actor may be more inclined toward an external attribution for the behaviors. Thus, the stronger the endorsement and authorization of the allocator who uses unfair procedures, the less severely unjust will the endorsement may exert stronger effects because the focal actor is more likely to identify with his or her peers when trying to determine what is going on in the situation.  Other hypotheses link procedural justice and the types of legitimacy to emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reactions, following the logic noted for the first experiment. These two experiments provide the basis for our initial foray into a relatively uncharted area of justice research: the importance of the collectivity in determining what is just and how people respond to injustice. Complementing my previous work on dyadic negotiation as a means to determine what is just, this new avenue of research focuses on the influence of multiple others, not simply one other who has a direct interest in the distribution of outcomes. At this point, we limit our focus to the effects of the collectivity on the individual. We intend, however, to extent research to allow examination of the effects of the dynamics of the collectivity on all individuals involved. Such a pursuit allows us to delve into the contrast between perceptions of justice for self and for others as well as to investigate systematically the interactive processes by which groups determine what is just. By doing so, we hope to illuminate how the beholder of justice is hardly isolated, but rather just one among a number of group members, all struggling to determine what is just. 
 

References

Cohen, R.L. (1986). Power and justice in intergroup relations." In H.W. Bierhoff, R.L. Cohen & J. Greenberg (Eds.), Justice in Social Relations (pp. 65-84). New York: 
Plenum. 

Hegtvedt, K. A. (1992). "Bargaining for justice:  A means to resolve competing justice claims. Social Justice Research, 5,155-172.

Hegtvedt, K.A., Brezina,T., & Funk, S.(1995). When Cries of `It's Not Fair' Are Not Fair: Paper presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C.

Hegtvedt, K.A., & Johnson, C. (2000). Justice beyond the individual: A future with legitimation. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63, 298-311.

Hegtvedt, K.A. & Markovsky, B. (1995). Justice and injustice. In K.S. Cook, G.A. Fine, & J.S. House (Eds.), Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology (pp. 257-280). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Johnson, C., & Ford, R. (1996). Dependence power, legitimacy, and tactical choice. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59,126-139.

Kahn, A., Nelson, R.E., Gaeddert, W.P., & Hearn, J.L. (1982). The justice process: Deciding upon equity or equality. Social Psychology Quarterly, 45, 3-8.

Lawler, E.J. (1975). An experimental study of factors affecting the mobilization of revolutionary coalitions. Sociometry, 38, 163-179. 

Lawler, E.J., & Thompson, M.E. (1978). Impact of leader responsibility for inequity on subordinate revolts. Social Psychology, 41, 65-68.

Lind, E.A., & Tyler, T.R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. New York: Plenum.

Ridgeway, C.L., &Walker, H.A. (1995). Status structures. In K.S. Cook, G.A. Fine, & J.S. House (Eds.), Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology (pp.
281-311). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, G.M., Walker, H.A., & and Zelditch, Jr., M. (1986). Legitimacy and
collective action. Social Forces, 65, 378-404.

Törnblom, K.Y. (1988). Positive and negative allocations: A typology and model of conflicting justice principles." In E.J. Lawler and B. Markovsky Eds.), Advances in
group processes, (vol. 5, pp. 141-168). Press.

Tyler, T.R. (1994).  Psychological models of the justice motive:
Antecedents of distributive and procedural justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 850-863.

Tyler, T.R., & Lind, E.A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (vol. 25, pp. 115-191).
San Diego: Academic Press 

Walker, H A., Thomas, G.M., & and Zelditch,
Jr., M. (1986). Legitimation, endorsement, and stability. Social Forces, 64,620-643.

Walker, H.A., & Zelditch, Jr., M. (1993). Power, legitimacy, and the stability of authority: A theoretical research program. In J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr., (Eds.), Theoretical research programs (pp. 364-381). Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.

Zelditch, Jr. M., & Walker, H.A. (1984). Legitimacy and the stability of authority. Advances in Group Processes, 1, 1-25.
 

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Interdisciplinary Social Justice Research
 

Stefan Liebig, Holger Lengfeld and Steffen Mau

For a long time, scholars of social justice research have called for closer cooperation between the empirical disciplines of sociology, psychology, and political science, on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other. Both sides should, so the popular argument goes (Birnbacher 1999; Scherer 1992), take notice of the other discipline(s) and make use of their results and knowledge. However, although this argument has some plausibility, the practical side seems to be rather difficult as the normative and the empirical areas of research are guided by different research interests (Singer, 1997). 

The junior research group “Interdisciplinary Social Justice Research” funded by the Volkswagen Stiftung at the Institute for Social Science, Humboldt University Berlin (Germany) is attempting to tackle these difficulties. In order to master this task the group is composed of scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds: sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and political philosophers. The group was initiated by Bernd Wegener, Hans-Peter Müller, Herfried Münkler, and Leo Montada, will run for five years (1998-2003), and works jointly on interdisciplinary projects. Such a project has been called for frequently, but rarely realized in practice. The vast majority of attempts have resulted merely in a listing of normative and empirical approaches, or have simply suggested which kind of cooperation would be desirable. The junior research group goes one step further by aiming at two different levels of inter-disciplinary work: first by addressing issues of basic research, and second by carrying out applied research projects. 

Three Conditions of Applying Normative Theories
Before thinking about a possible cooperation between empirical and normative justice research we have to recognize that the two areas have divergent research interests. The foremost task of a normative theory of justice is to enumerate justifications for justice rules which can be regarded as a critical yardstick for action and should determine the structure of a society (Barry 1995; Kymlicka 1990; Miller 1999; Rawls 1971). In order to justify the obligation to follow a certain justice rule, a normative theory needs to be abstract and removed from real situations.

Whether the postulated rules of justice are in accordance with justice ideas of the individuals is therefore irrelevant. Moreover, in order to guarantee that the justice rules possess an “objective” character, they must be persuasive independent of the physical and social conditions of those they claim to address. From a normative point of view, the decision about what should be considered “just” needs to be valid independent of (1) the empirical facts, and (2) the material interests of those who make the judgments.

Empirical justice research, in contrast, is concerned with the description and explanation of justice attitudes (Cohen 1987; Elster 1995; Tyler 1997). The main questions for this type of research are: why do people take a certain moral point of view? what are the social conditions of this choice? and what consequences do perceived injustices have for individual behavior as well as for collective phenomena? (Jasso & Wegener 1997) Empirical social justice research emphasizes the difference between its own self understanding and that of normative approaches: justice judgments are not solely a result of individual reasoning, but rather results of psychological or social factors. These judgments are of interest for the empirical sciences because they influence the “reality” of social life. Considerations such as whether a person takes account of all possible justifications and arguments, and whether her judgment is unbiased, which are essential to political philosophy, are, by contrast, of less interest to the empirical sciences. 

The first step towards an interdisciplinary approach in social justice research is to identify the need normative theories have for empirical knowledge. However, this is precarious terrain: whether, and if so, in what way a philosophical theory should rely on empirical data is a controversial question. Whether empirical data should be used to justify certain justice principles is hotly disputed (Miller 1999; Swift 1999). It can be argued that the empirical world --particularly “what the people think”--confines the “normatively thinkable” ex ante. Such an approach would force philosophers to adjust their normative frameworks to a given reality, thereby failing to live up to their task of criticizing the existing order and demanding change.

Less controversial is the argument that normative theories need empirical knowledge if they aspire to be of use for the design of the political or social order of a given society. For normative theorizing that seeks to be of practical value, one can distinguish three “test conditions” which should be met in order to assess their practical feasibility. Condition of adequacy: First, we have to ask whether a normative theory is based on an adequate description of its object. By this we mean that normative theorizing relies on assumptions about empirical mechanisms of distribution within societies. Without an accurate account of the distributive institutions such as the market, the state, and the intermediary sector, normative theories are at risk of proposing principles which are simply not applicable in a concrete society. Therefore, an adequate description of the mechanisms that constitute social inequality within a given society is an important starting point for a theory which is aims at social applicability.

Condition of recognition: Second, the arguments of a normative theory and their inferences must be understood and acknowledged by the persons they address. The core of this requires the development and firm justification of certain justice principles. Only those justice principles with demonstrated features of a moral obligation are likely to be acknowledged voluntarily by reasonable persons. This is the case when a person comes to accept a normative concept independent of the utility she could expect from the operation of such a norm in practice. The condition of recognition can be understood as the “rationality” of justification of a justice principle (moral rightness). Only if this condition is met--in other words, only if all persons addressed understand and validate a normative theory of justice --can a theory lay claim to be generally binding. The decisive question is whether people recognize a theory of justice as a moral obligation or not. 

Condition of application: Third, one has to clarify whether a political theory of justice is suited to influence real processes of distribution. By this we do not mean that persons should be able to re-construct a philosophical argument in their mind, acknowledge certain principles, or choose a certain principle on purely moral grounds. Rather, we refer to two primarily empirical issues. First, one has to operationalize the normative principles according to “real” conditions. For example, such a demand emerges in the case of the Rawlsian difference principle where it is necessary to identify the most disadvantaged groups in a society. And second, there is some need to examine the degree of support a theoretical concept can expect to receive in the context of certain political practices. These criteria are distinct from the issue of the moral rightness of such a proposal. A normative concept which regulates the distribution of goods can be desirable from a moral point of view, but at the same time be rejected on grounds of political prudence. This is often the case when such concepts are inconsistent with other political objectives a society wants to accomplish. 

Consequences for Empirical Justice Research
So far we have argued that a normative theory depends on empirical information if it aspires to affect the actual allocation of goods and burdens in a society. In this section we will offer some ideas on what kind of empirical information is necessary. The three “test conditions” enumerated above can be related to different kinds of information. The adequate description of the object requires data which provide information about the real mechanisms of distributions of goods in a society. Insights on these mechanisms typically come from sociological research on inequality, poverty, social welfare, and social structure. 

With respect to the condition of recognition, one has to take into account (1) whether persons evaluate the normative concepts from a perspective of impartiality, and (2) whether they make use of moral arguments when justifying their point of view (Barry 1995; Frohlich & Oppenheimer 1997; Singer 1997). For this question one can build on experimental studies such as those by Frohlich and Oppenheimer which aimed at simulating the Rawlsian “original position” in order to test whether respondents would choose the Rawlsian principle of equal freedom and the difference principle. 

With regard to the criteria of applicability of a normative theory, one needs “objective” data on the one hand, but also “subjective” data of peoples’ attitudes on the other. Objective data as provided by official statistics or social reports can be used to determine the type and level of resources necessary for the social subsistence of a person or a household. Data about income and material assets permit the identification of a society’s redistributive capacity. Subjective data, in contrast, help to provide insight on whether a concrete concept would receive social approval and support. Sociological and psychological justice research, as well as empirical policy research, are well equipped with appropriate methods and instruments to help us here. 

Basic and Applied Projects Projects tackling basic research issues are related to issues which must be addressed by interdisciplinary research. The first project focuses on an empirical account of the distinction between justice judgments in a narrow sense and justice attitudes as understood in most previous justice research. In this context we intend to bring two different areas of empirical research together: the experimental tradition inspired and pioneered by Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer, and the theoretical and methodological contributions of Guillermina Jasso. Vignette studies (factorial survey designs) are used for testing whether the justice judgments of the respondents change when they evaluate a distribution of goods or bads from an impartial point of view and with reference to moral norms. Examples include the evaluation of taxation or a just minimum wage.

A second field of research takes account of the conditions which affect an individual's justice attitudes. It is concerned with a problem that has attracted the social sciences for a long time: the micro-macro link. More specifically, it raises the question of how the social situation (the macro-level) determines the justice attitudes of individuals (the micro-level). We will place special emphasis on organizations and social networks in order to clarify the importance of these issues at a theoretical and empirical level. In this context it is interesting to note that recent research has highlighted the importance of organizations for structuring normative and justice-related phenomena, in particular social inequality. The reasons given emphasize that the social life of each person is increasingly penetrated by social organizations. This is apparent with respect to the allocation and distribution of social goods and social positions, but it is also true in other areas, such as the educational system where individual life courses and individual achievements are determined by organizational structures, or the world of employment where incomes and careers are affected by specific organizational cultures. This insight has been widely neglected in social justice research. Organizations have not played a significant role in normative theories, nor does much empirical justice research ask questions about the importance of organizations for justice attitudes in general. Hence, the question will be raised about whether and to what extent organizations are those arenas where ideals of justice and experiences of injustice become important for social behavior. The goal is to analyze the impact of organizational structures and the relations of cooperation (social networks) on attitudinal patterns. A third research project, titled “moral economy of modern societies,” analyzes the moral foundations of modern societies, especially the role of social justice. Moral economy is understood as a system of normatively motivated social transactions which contribute to a balancing in the allocation of social goods and social opportunities. Each transfer of resources has a normative and social logic which helps to generate, maintain, or stabilize social relations. Social arrangements and allocative principles are not just per se, nor can they expect to be accepted on solely functional grounds. Rather, they ought to relate to the normative motives of those concerned, and to contribute to a socially desirable resource allocation. Therefore, a “just” system of social transactions depends on relations between social groups and the moral assumptions held by members of those groups. This is the basis on which modern societies can motivate attitudes of solidarity among their members, and hence facilitate social integration and cohesion. The research questions focus on the social preconditions and institutional arrangements of such a moral economy and try to identify the corresponding norms of justice. 

Concurrently, we are pursuing three applied projects which have a stronger disciplinary orientation: 
(1) Industrial relations and the influence of justice attitudes. At the center of this research project stands the question of the extent to which the allocation of goods and burdens influences actual exchanges between employers and employees in firms. The research proceeds in two stages: the first investigates which individual, firm-endogenous and firm-exogenous factors influence the justice ideas of industrial workers; and the second focuses on the consequences of justice ideas by looking at indicators of individual behavior such as absenteeism and work motivation. In addition we will be investigating how ideas of justice influence the form and intensity of industrial bargaining between management and work councils. The analytical framework makes use of findings on justice in organizations and industrial relations research, as well as insights from cultural sociology. The empirical basis for this research is a survey of 834 employees in 21 enterprises in the German metal industry.

(2) Ethnic prejudices, perceptions of persons, and justice judgments. This project focuses on the role of ethnic prejudices and stereotypes in the evaluation of resource allocation. The initial step is the analysis of socially shared hierarchies of evaluation with regard to ethnic groups living in Germany. In this context, we assume that the subjective feeling of fraternal deprivation, or, more specifically, the perception of injustices with regard to the self, is a strong determinant of the social evaluation of ethnic groups. Building on this, we intend to carry out an experimental vignette-study in order to establish the impact of ethnic hierarchies on the justice evaluation of welfare payments and social transfers. 

(3) Social justice in the welfare state. The issue of social justice seems to be crucial for the reform of the welfare state. Not only the defenders of the traditional welfare compromise, but also those who argue for its fundamental reconstruction, refer to “social justice” in order to make their proposals socially acceptable. The resource conflicts and the political disputes about welfare indicate that the success of social reforms does not only depend on “technical” feasibility, but also on some kind of normative resonance. In this project we will look for the guiding justice motives and arguments of relevant political actors, as well as their social recognition. This normative dimension is especially interesting, because all reforms bring about a re-allocation of life chances and a re-definition of rights and duties. We will investigate both the way competing justice claims enter the political arena and invoke different normative concepts, and the ways in which political or philosophical concepts which have entered the public agenda find social acceptance and public support.

References

Barry, B. (1989). Theories of justice. Vol. 1. London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Birnbacher, D. (1999). Ethics and social science: Which kind of co-operation? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2: 319-336.

Cohen, R.L. (1987). Distributive justice: Theory and research. Social Justice Research, 1, 19-40.

Elster, J. (1995). The empirical study of justice. In D. Miller, & M. Walzer (eds.), Pluralism, justice, and equality (pp. 81-98). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frohlich, N., and Oppenheimer, J.A. (1992). Choosing justice. An experimental approach to ethical theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Frohlich, N., and Oppenheimer, J.A. (1997). A role for structured observations in ethics. Social Justice Research 10: 1-22.

Jasso, G., and Wegener, B. (1997). Methods for empirical justice analysis: Part I. Framework, models and quantities. Social Justice Research, 10: 393-430.

Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary political philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scherer, K.R. (Ed.). (1992). Justice: Interdisciplinary perspectives. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, M. (1997). Ethics and justice in organisations. Avebury: Aldershot.

Swift, A. (1999). Public opinion and political philosophy: The relation between social- scientific and philosophical analyses of distributive justice. Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, 2, 337-363.

Tyler, T.R., Boeckman, R.J., Smith, H.J., & Huo, Y.J. (1997). Social justice in a diverse society. Boulder, CO: Westview. 

For more information on the research projects, publications and working papers visit our web-site at 
http://www2.hu-berlin.de/isgf/
 

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News about SJR

The journal Social Justice Research (SJR) is the journal of ISJR. It was founded in 1987 by Melvin Lerner and was established as a major journal for justice research in social and behavioral science.

Social Justice Research is interdisciplinary. The sociological/anthropological articles are indexed and abstracted by Sociological Abstracts (since 1987); the psychological articles by PsychINFO database (American Psychological Association) since 1993; partly by PSYNDEX (German Institute of Psychology Information); by ASSIA (Applied Social Science Index and Abstracting); by Kluwer Document Viewer completely since 2000. It is announced to be completely indexed and abstracted by e- psyche, a new information provider.

Most important, it has been announced that SJR will be indexed by Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences and from this base it should be included in Social Science Citation Index. ISJR will take every effort to have the journal included in SSCI which plays such an important role in the world of science.

Of course, SJR has to compete with many other journals in the field, and many of them have well known and respectable impact factors. Given that SJR will be indexed in SSCI it is up to ISJR and its members to promote the impact factor of SJR. The strategies to do this are well known: The members of ISJR are requested to submit their best pieces to SJR, and they are requested to cite the articles they have read in SJR. There are some other strategies to further the visibility of SJR which can be handled by the editors.

SJR has the flexibility to publish not only single articles submitted but also topical issues that contain original research and integrative summaries focused on important concepts or themes.  We welcome nominations for such SJR issues and proposals that describe treatments of social justice topics and potential contributors.

It is in the self interest of the ISJR members and within the responsibility of ISJR to advance the impact of justice research. Let us make a joint effort to reach these goals.

Leo Montada and Ron Dillehay
 
 

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New Books about and around Justice

Section 1c (Newly Published Books)

Albin, C. (2001). Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Arrow, K., Bowles, S., & Durlauf, S. (Eds.). (2000). Meritocracy and
Economic Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Auhagen, A.E., & Bierhoff, H-W. (Eds.). (2001). Responsibility. The Many
Faces of a Social Phenomenon. London: Routledge.

Aureli, F. & and de Waal, F.B.M. (Eds.). (2000). Natural Conflict
Resolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Barkan, E. (2000). The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating
Historical Injustices. New York: Norton.

Bass, G.J. (2000). Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes
Tribunals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bazemore, S.G., & Schiff, M. (2001). Restorative Community
Justice: Repairing Harm and Transforming Communities. Cincinnati: Anderson
Publishing Company.

Boraine, A. (2001). A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. New York: Oxford University Press.

Borneman, J. (1997). Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and
Accountability in Postsocialist Europe. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Brams, S.J., & Taylor, A.D. (1999). The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing
Fair Shares to Everybody. New York:  W.W. Norton.

Brooks, P. (2000).  Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and
Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Buchanan, A., Daniels, N., Brock, D., & Wikler, D. (2000). From Chance to
Choice: Genetics and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Clark, C. (1997). Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Cole, L.W., &  Foster, S. (2000). From the Ground up: Environmental Racism
and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement. New York: New York
University Press.

Conley, J.M., & O'Barr, W.M. (1998). Just Words: Law, Language, and Power.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cook, K.S. (Ed.). (2000). Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation

Cropanzano, R. (Ed.). (2001). Justice in the Workplace: From Theory to
Practice, Vol. 2. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Dalbert, C. (In press). The Justice Motive as Personal Resource: Dealing
with Challenges and Critical Life Events. New York: Kluwer/Plenum.

Darley, J.M., Messick, D.M., & Tyler, T.R.. (Eds.). (2001). Social
Influences on Ethical Behavior in Organizations. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

De Dreu, C., & de Vries, N. (Eds.). (2001). Group Consensus and Minority
Influence: Implications for Innovation. Williston, VT: Blackwell.

Deutsch, M., & Coleman, P.  (Eds.). (2000). The Handbook of Conflict
Resolution: Theory and Practice. San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass.

Deveaux, M. (2001). Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.

Dobbs, A. (Ed.). (1999). Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental
Sustainability and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.

Edelman, M. (2001). The Politics of Misinformation. New York: Cambridge
University Press. 

Ewick, P., Kagan, R.A., & and Sarat, A.D. (Eds.). (1999). Social Science,
Social Policy, and the Law. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Ewick, P. & Silbey, S.S. (1998).  The Common Place of Law: Stories from
Everyday Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Feather, N.T. (1999). Values, Achievement, and Justice: Studies in the
Psychology of Deservingness. New York: Kluwer/Plenum.

Finkel, N.J. (2001). Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Finkel,  N.J. (2001). Not Fair!: The Typology of Commonsense Unfairness.
Washington: American Psychological Association.

Gilliland, S., Steiner, D., & Skarlicki, D. (Eds.). (2001).  Research
Issues in Management: Theoretical and Cultural Perspectives on
Organizational Justice (Vol. 1). Greenwich, CT: Information Age
Publishing.

Godelier, M. (1999).  The Enigma of the Gift. Translated by N. Scott.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 

Goldstone, R.J.  (2000). For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes
Investigator. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Greenberg, J., & Cropanzano, R. (2001). Advances in Organizational
Justice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hadley, M.L. (2001). The Spiritual Roots of Restorative Justice. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.

Hammond, K.R.  (2000). Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible
Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Hampshire, S. (1999). Justice Is Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

Harcourt, B. (2001). Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken
Windows Policing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Helmick, R.G., & Petersen, R.L. (Eds.). (2001). Forgiveness and
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation.
Chicago: Templeton Foundation Press.

Hoffman, M.L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for
Caring and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jasper, J.M. (1997). The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and
Creativity in Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kahneman,D., Diener, E., & and Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (1999). Well-Being: The
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Katz, J. (1999).  How Emotions Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kluegel, J.R., & Mason, D.S. Mason (Eds.). (2001). Marketing
Democracy: Changing Opinion about Inequality and Politics in East Central
Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kocks, D.E. (2000). Dream a Little: Land and Social Justice in Modern
America. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kuklinski, J.H. (Ed.). (2001). Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from
Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marcus, G.E., Neuman, W.R., & MacKuen, M. (2000).  Affective Intelligence
and Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Miller, D. (1999). Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
 

Minow, M. (1998). Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after
Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston: Beacon Press.

Nolan, J.L.Jr. (2000).  Reinventing Justice: The American Drug Court
Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nucci, L. (2001). Education in the Moral Domain. New York: Cambridge
University Press

O¹Neill, O. (2000). Bounds of Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.

Page, B. I. and Simmons, J.R. (2000). What Government Can Do: Dealing with
Poverty and Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Prentice, D.A., & Miller, D.T. (Eds.). (1999). Cultural Divides:
Understanding and Overcoming Group Conflict. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

Rhode, D.L. (2000). In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal
Profession. New York: Oxford University Press.

Roemer, J.E. (2000). Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.

Ross, M., & Miller, D. (Eds.). (In press).  The Justice Motive in Social
Life: Essays in Honor of Melvin Lerner. New York:  Cambridge University
Press.

Rotberg, R.I., & Thompson, D. (Eds.). (2000). Truth V. Justice: The
Morality of Truth Commissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sanders, J., & Hamilton, V.L. (Eds.). (2001). Handbook of Justice Research
in Law. New York: Kluwer/Plenum.

Sarat, A., & Kearns, T.R. (Eds.). (1998). Justice and Injustice in Law and
Legal Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Scarry, E. (1999). On Beauty and Being Just. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Shapiro, I. (2001). Democratic Justice. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shiffrin, S.H. (1999). Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Shreve, S.R., & Shreve, P. (Eds.). (1997). Outside the Law: Narratives on
Justice in America. Boston: Beacon Press.

Shuman, D.W., &  McCall-Smith, A. (2000). Justice and the Prosecution of
Old Crimes: Balancing Legal, Psychological, and Moral Concerns.
Washington. American Psychological Association.

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory
of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suls, J., & Wheeler, L. (2000). Handbook of Social Comparison: Theory and
Research. Norwell, MA: Kluwar/Academic.

Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S. (2000). Cooperation in Groups: Procedural
Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement. Philadelphia:
Psychology Press.

Umbreit, M.S. (2000). The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation : An
Essential Guide to Practice and Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T.R., & Biel, A. (2000). Cooperation in
modern society. London: Routledge.

Wilson, R. (2001). The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South
Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Worthington, E.L. (Eds.). (1998). Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological
Research & Theological Perspectives. Chicago: Templeton Foundation Press.

Zartman, W., & Rubin, J.Z. (Eds.). (2000). Power and Negotiation. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Zucker, R. (2001). Democratic Distributive Justice. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
 

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Forthcoming election of the next President

The election of the next President of ISJR will be hold during the summer months. 
It will have the following steps:

1. Nomination of candidates by the members

2. On the basis of the nominations the Executive Board will put together the slate 
of candidates of this year for approval.

3. The members will vote through mail ballot.

4. The Executive Board will inform about the process, the participation rate and the 
results of the election.
 

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Awards and Honourings

We have the pleasure to announce that Dahlia Moore has received the McGregor Award for her article "Gender Identities and Social Action: Arab and Jewish Women in Israel", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.
Congratulations!
 
 

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The End